IANAL, but I note that criminal accusations typically require some evidence of *willful* wrongdoing. Civil complaints may use the lighter standard of "could have known" or "should have known."

Being wrong but sincerely wrong and well-intentioned might be enough to get a person off the hook in many situations. But it's not enough for doctors. The "should have known" standard applies. People die when doctors get their facts wrong.

In principle, the authority which must be attached to the definitions of words in Van Dale does not exceed that of other bodies to which knowledge of the subjects in question can be ascribed. In fact, Van Dale often carries even less authority. A definition in Van Dale is there-fore by no means to be seen as the only source of referral. Dictionary makers try to derive definitions from general language usage, basing themselves on references which are consid-ered representative.
In the prefaces since the 12th edition Van Dale’s editors write:
‘The dictionary maker can only hope that his definitions succeed in giving the reader some insight into the hardly fathomable phenomenon called description of meaning.’
Dictionary definitions do of course offer some basis, but as far as authority is concerned, they not necessarily outweigh other definitions. (…) A well-known and unavoidable weakness are the ‘loops’ in dictionary definitions: under abstract we find ‘not concrete’ – and under con-crete we fin ‘not abstract.’ Circularity in descriptions of meaning generally indicates that the competence of others is needed to provide the lexicographer with more specific informa-tion.(…)
We can conclude that lexicographers should not and in fact do not deny bodies of recognized authority other than themselves the qualification to formulate relevant descriptions and defini-tions of a given concept. On the contrary, whenever necessary and possible, they particularly derive their descriptions from expert’s language usage.
One could argue that in disputes of a various nature, practical considerations militate for using the dictionary deemed by the majority as most authoritative as the only source for descriptions of meaning. However, a ponderous argument against this is that dictionary definitions are not always adequate to serve as such.
For example, how is it to be decided on the basis of a dictionary in which cases the ‘capacity’ of being ‘judicious’ in matters concerning the relevant field of expertise may be ascribed to a certain practitioner or organisation? Because the dictionary can provide no decisive answers to this question, in these cases definitions will have to be made more explicit – while avoiding circularity – with additional criteria, preferably provided by persons with extensive knowledge in the particular area.
Thus, the question as to who may be qualified as a quack should primarily be answered by those who, by law or any other recognized authority or in a particular capacity, are deemed to be judicious in the field of medicine. Van Dale does not have such authority.

In summary: the dictionary is a useful but by no means infallible source of information con-cerning the meaning of words. Especially in disputes, more expertise and explicitness is needed. The judge cannot avoid the duty to determine which persons are to be considered authoritative in the relevant area: who can decide whether someone is judicious in matters of medicine? It is these persons, dear David and Exarch, who can say whether someone is a quack or not. (Replace dictionary by ‘judge’ and quack by ‘bogus’!)

That was sloppy of me. By 'them' I meant the treatments themselves not the words being used to describe the treatments.

When I say 'quack' I mean 'quack' and I definitely mean it in a deeply pejorative way. I do not want a situation where we are forced to pretend that we mean these words to be used in a sense characterised by the more polite end of the dictionary definition. I do not mean that most quacks are deliberately dishonest, but if I think of someone as a quack and would like to describe them as such in public I definitely mean it to imply that they are reckless of the truth of what they claim and very possibly ignorant of how to establish the truth. It is wholly unreasonable that they can go crying to Mummy/Justice Eady to complain that big boys have been rude to them instead of being forced to place their counter-arguments in the domain of public discourse for all to see. What we are seeing at the moment is quacks tending to run to the referee because they can't play the game very well.

Behind all this us the problem that the law seems to see all 'reputations' as being equal. A defining quality of a quack is that their reputation is illegitimately acquired. That reputation needs to be destroyed, indeed it is our moral duty to do so!

There should be a guarantee of right to reply but no guarantee of a right to suppress critical comment.

I think we are in danger at the moment of being too mealy-mouthed and I see some of the defence of the word 'bogus' or the Dutch society's self-definition of the word 'quack' as being a bit disingenuous. These are meant to be rude words and I feel that the attempts being made to take the sting out of them are a bit expedient.

One last point on shades of meaning. If someone is a 'bogus doctor' they are committing a conscious fraud. If a quack deals in bogus treatments they may well not be frauds but there is definitely a sense in which that axis of therapist and therapy is immoral in a way that innocent use of a reasonable but disproven treatment by a non-quack is not.

I can think of examples of diseases where they used to be treated one way, but medicine has moved on and our basis of understanding has changed so we treat those same diseases in a wholly different way. I don't think a physician would describe the previous mode of treatment as 'bogus', it would be called 'out-moded' or 'disproven' or 'superseded'. Bogus carries a pejorative edge that it shares, for instance, with 'discredited'. Both words reflect badly on those advocating and using them, and rightly so.

Eady defined 'bogus' as in 'bogus doctor', but I think it is equally wrong to counter that by saying that bogus means the same as 'ineffective'. It does not.

I think that Simon Singh's intention in those unfortunate sentences was to capture that morally deficient status, but genuinely without implying actual dishonesty.

If statutory regulation of CAM will be adopted in UK, Singh's case will seem simply childish feast compared to future situation!

Say "No" to a possible statutory regulation of CAM in UK.

Quackery has existed for many years and it may have been assumed in many quarters that it is a simple act of fraud. But we can re-appraise the many quacks both past and present and see that quackery need not be fraud but can arise from much more interesting and complex psychological motivational factors. It is quite probable that the popular understanding of quackery is quite wrong and that those interested in the subject should attempt to correct these misconceptions. It looks like the VtdK did just this. As I say, it is a tyranny of the man on the Clapham omnibus (or Amsterdam tram) to judge them against these misconceptions.

Simon Singh used a word 'bogus' that also has a fluid meaning – its pop culture meaning has shifted away from its original 'counterfeit' meaning. Writing in a daily newspaper should take this into account – especially when Simon actually described the specific meaning he was using within a spectrum of possible meanings. Again, to judge Simon by a definition that was not his own and at an extreme of possible usages is again an injustice.

At the same time, murder for example, is a pretty well defined legal term to start with, and on top of that there's not much wiggle room to define it as anything less than one person taking another person's life.

There are however plenty of words that offer a much wider scope of misuse. Words already laden with emotion, like racism, sexism, etc…
People should be free to say whatever they want, but at the same time be willing to take the consequences of their words if they violate someone else's rights. Especially if they use those words in a meaning too far removed from the dictionary definition. Iit's not just about what you want to say, it's also about what you want your audience to hear.

As far as I know though, calling someone out on their publicly spouted bulls#!t is not a violation of their rights. It's showing them the consequences of their OWN "freely spoken" words …
Both Mrs Sickezs and the BCA are suffering the consequences of having their baseless assertions examined. Something they could have avoided had they been more truthful with their claims.

For example I couldn't write an article accusing someone of being a murderer even if I defined the word murderer as something other than that generally understood by the term purely for the purposes of the article.

Maybe this has some way to run.

In my opinion Mrs Sickesz had been angered by a newspaper report about her nomination as the 7th worst Dutch quack of the 20th century. Indeed, the article in "de Volkskrant" used the terms quack, liar, cheat, charlatan many times and obviously as synonyms of each other. Later the chairman of the Society wrote a kind letter to her explaining that it wasn't meant like that, but in the end this could not make Mrs. Sickesz anger subside, especially because she is convinced of the value of her treatment mode.

So the Supreme Court delved into the question: "can the Society be held responsible for misinterpretations?" The Amsterdam higher court had argued that the common meaning of "quack" was so evident that any prudent person would have known that there would be a serious risk that journalists would not pay attention to the Society's own definition. The Amsterdam lower court had said just the opposite. The Supreme Court said that the Society had been clear enough.

So in a kind of juridical calculus, the Supreme Court decided that the Amsterdam higher court had not provided enough reasons for its opinion. (In the Netherlands the Supreme Court only decides whether the judges have applied the law correctly.) The law clearly implies that if art. 10 ECHR is ignored or judged to be not important enough, then this should be very carefully argued. This careful argumentation was missing from the decision of the Amsterdam higher court. In fact they didn't even mention art. 10 ECHR if I recall correctly. Merely pointing at a dictionary definition and simply ignoring the care the Society took to explain its intentions, cannot be considered a carful argumentation.

Put more simply: art. 10 ECHR (Freedom of expression) is not absolute, but you have to be extremely careful to argue that there are cogent reasons why this article must yield to other articles of the European Convention of Human Rights.

If the case is ever retried (it's not up to the Society or the Supreme Court to decide this) the judges will have to take into account the directives of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has also said that Mrs. Sickesz' claim to (e.g.) cure epilepsy by manipulating the neck is clearly unscientific and that therefore the Society's definition applies.

As long as there is no decision in a retrial, the verdict of the Amsterdam lower court (which in favor of the society) stands.